

- 747 Of less obvious importance than the police sections, but nevertheless of great significance were the agencies concerned with health, social security, and welfare. The extreme limitations placed upon the efforts of the local administrations to maintain their starving citizens have already been described. Nevertheless, the fact that they could carry on activity was of some importance, both from the practical standpoint and from that of providing the population with token participation in administration. The Germans were undoubtedly content to leave this arduous and thankless task to the local leaders. Welfare activities were in part the responsibility of municipal departments, in part the function of volunteer organizations. This duplication gave rise to the possibility of conflicting political trends in the same field of operation. In Kiev the head of the welfare department, until his consecration as an Autocephalous bishop, was Professor Haiievskiy,¹⁹ and even after his resignation the department seems to have been in the hands of nationalist elements. The paucity of the resources available to this section has been indicated in a preceding chapter; nevertheless, it was able to arrange for the provision of buildings for care of the distressed.²⁰ At the same time, the Ukrainian Red Cross, which had been formed as an organ of the city government and which had carried on extensive operations in relieving the horrible conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps, had been dissolved by the Germans. Apparently this action was due in part to its use by Nationalist elements as a screen for their activities, but more particularly to its humane exertions. Its leader, Professor Theodore Bohatyrychuk, who, after having welcomed collaboration with the OUN-M group, had become disgusted with its excesses in Kiev, now turned to support of the Russophile element.²¹ His organization, which was reformed as the All-Ukrainian Aid Committee (Vseukraïns'kyi

after explosions set off by Communist agents in Kiev in the autumn of 1941, arrested only Russians, scores of whom were then shot (Interviews 19, 59). However, a German order provided that Ukrainians were not to be taken as hostages while Russians were to be arrested for this purpose (Order of Befehlshaber des Rückwärtigen Heeresgebiet Süd, August 16, 1941, NOKW 1691; hereafter referred to as NOKW 1691).

¹⁹ *Ukrains'ka Diismist*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Interviews 19, 71.

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Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),²² one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity²³ was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces. [186]

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.²⁴ In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.²⁵ In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.²⁶

²² *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4-5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

²³ Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

²⁴ For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266-69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

²⁵ Interview 73.

²⁶ Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.